The Oster Conspiracy Plan and the British Connection
In the summer of 1938, German military intelligence had detailed plans for a coup that would remove Adolf Hitler from power (see the last Historka post). An attack force was armed and ready to take over the Reichs Chancellery, arrest Hitler, and prevent Gestapo and SS from interfering while the military took control of government until new civilian leadership could be put in place.
The operation flamed out, however, as leaders tossed “their lovely plans and projects into the fire” at the end of September. (John Grehan: The Hitler Assassination Attempts, p 69). The so-called Oster Conspiracy failed because emissaries could not convince Britain to stand up to and stop Hitler from actions that could lead to war. Instead, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain negotiated what he believed to be “peace with honour…peace for our time.” (The Hitler Assassination Attempts, p 69)
The Spring of 1938
In the summer of 1938, German military intelligence had detailed plans for a coup that would remove Adolf Hitler from power (see the last Historka post). An attack force was armed and ready to take over the Reichs Chancellery, arrest Hitler, and prevent Gestapo and SS from interfering while the military took control of government until new civilian leadership could be put in place.
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205193838
On the morning of March 12, two mechanized divisions of German troops crossed the border with Austria and traveled to Vienna. Without a shot being fired, the Third Reich completed Anschluss, full annexation of the country. Though a violation of the Versailles Treaty, the move was not viewed by European countries as serious enough to warrant a strong military response or war. The vast majority of Austrians after all approved of unification with Germany (99.7 percent voted in favor of it in an April referendum), and while France and Britain may have fretted, they did nothing to oppose the action. In-country military and political situations kept the two countries on the sidelines. Both France and Britain had weak military forces in the Rhineland; France did not have a fully seated parliament; and many in Britain believed the “Germans were only going into their own back garden.” (https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/znxdnrd/revision/3)
The threat of war was far greater a little over a month later when German military units amassed along the border with Czechoslovakia, and in response, the Czech government mobilized military reservists and strengthened fortifications.
Czechoslovakia’s principal ally, France, as well as Britain issued a warning. Both countries vowed to support Czechoslovakia against aggression, stating that any move by Germany could lead to “European conflagration.” (The Hitler Assassination Attempts, p 62)
Members of the Oster group felt vindicated. To their way of thinking, their plan to remove Hitler from power was the only way to prevent another war on the continent. All they had to do to initiate their coup was get a firm commitment that Britain would take up arms in support of an independent Czechoslovakia.
Secret Missions
From July to early September, the Oster group sent German diplomat Erich Kordt and landowner Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin to meet with leaders of the British government--chief advisor to the British Foreign Office Sir Robert Vansittart, backbencher at the time Winston Churchill, and foreign secretary Lord Halifax.
A primary objective: to impress upon British officials the gravity of the situation. On April 21, Hitler had ordered the army General Staff to prepare for a full-scale invasion of Czechoslovakia no later than October 1. A preemptive strike, code named Case Green, was in keeping with Hitler’s “unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia in the near future…and then … tackle the situation in the west” in three or four years. (Herbert Malloy Mason: To Kill the Devil, p 37) Hitler was determined to create a German Empire encompassing Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Burgundy, Alsace-Lorraine, and Switzerland before moving on to Poland, Ukraine, the Baltics, and Scandinavia.
Equally important for Oster conspirators was ensuring that Britain would take aggressive steps to intercede when Hitler moved ahead with the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the promise that the Oster Conspiracy would then proceed with a coup. “Bring me certain proof that England will fight if Czechoslovakia is attacked,” Kleist told Vansittart, “and I will make an end to this regime.” (To Kill the Devil, p 38)
British Reactions
https://www.amazon.com/Oster-Conspiracy-1938-Military-Hitler/dp/0060955252
Ignoring Clear Signs
But British officials turned a blind eye toward threats of German aggression against Czechoslovakia. On July 18, Wehrmacht Cpt. Fritz Wiedemann carried Hitler’s direct message to Lord Halifax that he would not wait much longer. Czechoslovakia was stopping Sudeten Germans from returning to their Homeland. “If no satisfactory solution has been achieved soon, I will solve this question with violence,” Hitler told the foreign secretary through Wiedemann. (Terry Parssinen: The Oster Conspiracy of 1938, p 55)
Lord Halifax nevertheless pushed for a binding declaration that Germany would not resort to armed conflict. When Wiedemann reiterated Hitler’s resolve and impatience, Halifax asked for a timetable: “How long do we have to solve the problem peacefully?” he asked. “Approximately until March 1939,” he was told.
Halifax either misunderstood or misrepresented the entire interchange when he reported that the German government was “planning no kind of forcible action” and “until [March, 1939] we can achieve a lot.” (The Oster Conspiracy of 1938, p 55)
Mediation
On July 16, Chamberlain announced he was sending an intermediary to push for peaceful resolution of the differences between the Czechoslovak government and Sudeten Germans-- Lord Runciman, shipping magnate and former president of the UK Board of Trade. Despite claims that he would act independently as an “investigator and mediator” in keeping with Czechoslovakia’s wishes, the Czech government had not asked for assistance.
To the contrary, Runciman was speaking for the British government and his mission was to push Czechs to accede to Sudeten demands. (Runciman’s efforts soon failed. Sudeten Germans rejected every offer made by the Czech government. (The Oster Conspiracy of 1938, p 88)
Traitors
Chamberlain and others in the British cabinet considered Oster operatives not as protectors of peace but outright traitors to their country. Von Kleist reminded Chamberlain of Jacobites [British traitors at the Court of France during the reign of King William] and “we must discount a good deal of what he [Kleist] says,” Chamberlain said. (The Oster Conspiracy of 1938, p 74)
Sir Robert Vansittart likewise viewed Oster men with suspicion, seeing little difference between them and Nazis. “The same sort of ambitions are sponsored by a different body of men, and that is about all.” (The Oster Conspiracy of 1938, p 75.)
Nothing To Do about It Anyway
At an emergency meeting August 30, Halifax acknowledged the only possibly effective deterrent to German aggression would be a declaration that Britain would declare war if the Nazis invaded Czechoslovakia. But then what? It wasn’t clear whether the country could actually take action and win a war against Germany.
And what would even come of it anyway? “There was nothing which would prevent Czechoslovakia from being overrun by Germany,” and it was “unlikely” that “any peace reached at the end of such a war would recreate Czechoslovakia as it existed today.” (The Oster Conspiracy of 1938, p 90)
In the end, few among the British government, other than Winston Churchill, saw the need to listen to the Oster conspirators and make clear to Germany that it would counter any aggression toward Czechoslovakia. Churchill in mid-August proposed forming a grand alliance involving Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and even the US to assure that Czechoslovakia remained independent. He also hoped the British government would support Oster and others’ anti-war efforts within Germany as well as Oster’s planned coup to create a new German government “that could guarantee stability and end the fear of war.” (The Oster Conspiracy of 1938, p 72, 76)
In September even Lord Halifax had come to agree with the Oster conspirators. As requested by Kordt, Halifax drafted a speech that explicitly warned Hitler about the likelihood of war if he took the steps he had planned against Czechoslovakia. After Chamberlain and others vetoed that idea, Halifax sent a strongly worded message to Hitler via the British ambassador in Germany. The ambassador refused to deliver it, however, believing the message could push Hitler “over the edge…if not of actual madness, of mad action.” (The Oster Conspiracy of 1938, p 106)
The Rest Is History
Neville Chamberlain flew to Germany to meet one-on-one with Adolf Hitler on September 15, thus beginning shuttle diplomacy that led to the international meeting in Munich and the Munch Agreement ceding Sudetenland to Germany, creating an international commission to determine the fate of the rest of Czechoslovakia, and finalizing a short-lived peace treaty between Germany and Britain.
The Oster Conspiracy of 1938 had come to an end. One operative recalled how Oster and two others spent the evening on the day German troops occupied Sudetenland: “meditating, not on Hitler’s triumph, but on the calamity that had befallen Europe.” (To Kill the Devil, p 50)
Others put the blame at the feet of Neville Chamberlain: “Chamberlain has made war inevitable.”(The Hitler Assassinations, p 69) “Chamberlain has saved Hitler.” (Target Hitler, p 80)
As for Oster? He kept the handwritten pages of his coup plan locked in his office safe. They lay untouched until 1939. (See the next Historka post)
Sources:
Herbert Molloy Mason, Jr: To Kill the Devil, W W Norton & Co., 1978.
John Grehan: The Hitler Assassination Attempts, Frontline Books, 2022.
Roger Moorhouse: Killing Hitler, Bantam Books, 2006.
Terry Parssinen: The Oster Conspiracy of 1938, Harper Collins Publishers, 2003.
James P. Duffy and Vincent L. Ricci: Target Hitler, Praeger, 1992.